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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT, INC. ET AL.;
Petitioners and Appellees,
Appellate Case No. 20080998-SC

vs.
PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY;
Respondent and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
*** *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-3- 102(3)(j). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Appellee General Construction & Development, Inc. (hereinafter GCD),
developed and built Rockwell Condominiums in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, and is also
the owner of several of the condominium units in question (R. 72). GCD contracted with
Lonnie Pace of Pace Plumbing to do the plumbing work for Rockwell Condominiums

and Pace Plumbing performed the plumbing work on each of the condominium units in
question (R. 70).
Unbeknownst to GDC, Pace Plumbing sub-contracted with Appellant Peterson
Plumbing Supply to provide materials to the units (R. 70). GCD paid Pace Plumbing in
full for all the work and materials that were provided (R. 70). GCD required Pace
Plumbing to sign a Conditional Waiver and Release of Claims where Pace released any
lien rights it had and warranted that all subcontractors and material men had been paid in
full (R. 69). GCD believed that Pace Plumbing had paid all material men in full (R. 67).
However, Pace Plumbing failed to pay Peterson Plumbing Supply for the materials they
provided (R. 66-67). GCD was not aware that Peterson Plumbing Supply had not been
paid or that they had even provided materials (R. 66-67). Peterson Plumbing did not
provide materials or labor to the buildings after December 17, 2008 because the
certificates of occupancy were issued betv/een October 11, 2007 and December 17, 2007
(R. 4-49).
On July 1, 2008 Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its first mechanics' lien notices
on Building X of Rockwell Condominiums (R. 69, 19-13). Then on August 6, 2008 and
August 21, 2008 Peterson Plumbing Supply filed the remaining mechanics' lien notices
(R. 66-69, 4-49). Each one of these mechanics' lien notices was filed more than 180 days
after the final completion of the original contract as established by the certificates of
occupancy (R. 93-94, 22-320).
Shortly after becoming aware of the first mechanics' liens that had been recorded
on building X, GCD called the Lien Recovery Fund to inquire if they could have the
2

mechanics' liens removed because GCD had a written contract and had paid the contract
in full (R. 151). GCD learned that they did not qualify for the Lien Recovery Fund
because the buildings were fourplexes and sixpiexes and only single family residences or
duplexes qualified (R. 151). See Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102. While speaking with the
Lien Recovery Fund GCD discovered that a notice of completion could be filed with the
State Construction Registry to reduce the time period for filing a mechanics' lien notice
(R. 104-105, 151). On M y 29, 2008 and August 8, 2008 GCD voluntarily filed notices
of completion on all the properties so that the State Construction Registry would know
that the buildings were finished (R. 104-105, 151). The notices of completion were filed
after the mechanics' liens were recorded on Building X and Building N but before the
mechanics' liens were recorded on the remaining buildings (R. 69, 291).
Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a total of twenty-two (22) mechanics' lien notices
against Rockwell Condominiums that are related to this appeal (R. 66-69). Notably,
Peterson Plumbing does not dispute that it provided false information on 20 of the 22
mechanics' lien notices regarding the date the last work or materials were provided (R.
66-69, 4-49). The last date materials were provided, as falsely claimed by Peterson
Plumbing, was after the date the Certificate of Occupancy had been issued on the
property and no work or materials were provided to the condominium units after the
Certificate of Occupancy had been issued (R. 66-69, 4-49).
Peterson Plumbing never contacted GCD to inform them that they had not been
paid by Pace Plumbing for the materials they provided (R. 1-2, 65-66). If fact, Peterson
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Plumbing continued to supply materials to Pace Plumbing even thought Pace Plumbing
failed to pay Peterson Plumbing for over six months (R. 1-2, 65-66).
On August 13, 2008, after receiving notice of the mechanics1 liens, GCD sent
Peterson Plumbing a written request to remove the wrongful liens because they were filed
in a untimely manner(R. 1-2). However, Peterson Plumbing refused to remove the liens
(R. 1-2). After the written request to remove the mechanics' liens went unheeded, GCD
filed a Petition to Nullify the mechanics' liens on September 17, 2008 (R 1-73).
The remaining Appellees are the owners of individual condominium units located
in Rockwell Condominiums (R. 70-72). When these homeowners purchased their homes,
no mechanics' liens were recorded on the property (R. 102, 318, 317). In addition, when
this case was filed, Appellees owned their homes for at least eight months to a year (R
102, 318, 317). Appellees paid in full for their homes and did not owe any money to
Peterson Plumbing or Pace Plumbing (R. 317).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) states that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed
with 90 days of a notice of completion, if one is filed, or within 180 days of final
completion of the original contract. The intent of a notice of completion is to shorten the
time period for filing a mechanics' lien and not to extend that time period past the 180
day. Peterson Plumbing asserts that their mechanics' lien notices were filed timely, even
though they were filed more than 180 days after the completion of the original contract,
because they contend that the notices of completion filed by GCD resurrected their lien
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rights. Peterson Plumbing's reading of the statute would make parts of the statute
superfluous and make the statute virtually inoperable.
Peterson Plumbing further asserts that even if the mechanics' lien notices were
recorded belatedly, they do not constitute a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah's Wrongful
Lien Act because mechanics' liens are "expressly authorized" by statute. Further,
Peterson Plumbing asserts that Peterson Plumbing supply was "entitled to a lien under
Section 38-1-3" of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act and therefore the lien cannot be wrongful
by law. Utah case law is clear that if a lien is not timely filed, then the lien right perishes
inchoate and all the rights and remedies under the mechanics lien statute are immediately
extinguished. The failure to timely file a mechanics' lien is fatal and cannot be remedied.
If a mechanics' lien notice is filed past the time period to file a lien, the notice of lien is
invalid from the beginning because the lien right has already perished. If no lien rights
exist at the time of filing the lien, the lien claimant cannot be "entitled to a lien" nor can
the lien be filed "pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Liens". Because Peterson
Plumbing clearly failed to timely file their mechanics' lien notices, the mechanics' lien
notices were wrongful pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act.
Ultimately, the trial court was correct in finding that Peterson Plumbing's
mechanics' lien notices were untimely and therefore void ab initio. The trial court held
that because Peterson Plumbing's lien rights had expired, Peterson Plumbing was not
"entitled" to file a mechanics lien and therefore the liens were wrongful. For the reasons
stated hereafter, the trial court's decision should be affirmed and Appellees should be
awarded their attorneys fees pursuant to statute.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PETERSON
PLUMBING'S MECHANICS5 LIEN NOTICES WERE UNTIMELY
AND THEREFORE VOID AB INITIO.

The first issue before this Court is the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7
(2008) which states in the pertinent part:
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and
claim a lien within:
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under
Section 38-1-33.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). The trial court correctly
interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) when it held that the intent of the legislature
was that a Notice of Completion could only shorten the time period from 180 days to 90
days to file a mechanics' lien notice and could not extend the time period past 180 days
(R.279, 108-109).
Peterson Plumbing asserts that the filing of a Notice of Completion, even if years
or decades have passed since the 180 day deadline expired, would resurrect the lien rights
and allow a lien claimant to file a mechanics' lien notice within the next 90 days after the
Notice of Completion is filed1. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11-14. This interpretation is

1

The facts in this case are not in dispute but a clarification of the facts is necessary.
Peterson Plumbing claims that it "filed a mechanics' lien notice within 90 days of the
filing of a notice of completion" with respect to each condominium. See Brief of
Appellant pg. 11. This is not correct. Peterson Plumbing actually filed mechanics' lien
notices on the four units in Building N and the six units in Building X before a notice of
6

clearly erroneous and was not the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the statutory
history of the Mechanics' Lien Statute and the Senate floor debates. Further, Peterson
Plumbing's interpretation creates and absurd, unreasonable or inoperable result which
would render portions of the statute superfluous.
A. The statutory history of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 and the Senate
floor debates show that the 2009 changes to Utah Code Ann, § 38-17 was a clarification and not a substantial change in the law.
Peterson Plumbing asserts that the language in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is
not ambiguous and that a plain reading of the statute allows for a mechanics' lien to be
filed after the 180 day deadline if a notice of completion is filed after that same 180 day
deadline. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11-15. This argument is mistaken. A plain reading
of the statute, without looking to the legislative history, reveals that the statute is
ambiguous because it can conceivably be interpreted to mean: 1) that a filing of a notice
of completion could extend the deadline past 180 days of completion, and 2) that a filing
of a notice of completion cannot extend the deadline past 180 days. If the statutory
language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to legislative history and
public policy to ascertain the statute's intent. See Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State,
2006 UT 9, t 59, 131P.3d208.
The statutory history of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act shows that the legislature
did not intend for a Notice of Completion to allow an undeterminable amount of time to

completion had been filed with the State Construction Registry and not "within 90 days
of the filing of a notice of completion". (R. 69, 291). It is not disputed that all of the
mechanics' lien notices were filed more than 180 days after final completion of the
original contract. See Brief of Appellant pg. 11.
7

file a mechanics' lien notice. Utah first enacted a mechanics' lien statute while a
Territory even before it's admission to Statehood. See Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 112, 121 (UT
Terr. 1873). After Utah became a State the territorial statute was re-codified in 1898 as
Mechanics' Lien Act Chapter 1 Title 39. See Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 258-259 (Utah 1909). The pertinent sections of
the 1884, 1898, 1953, 2006, 2008 and 2009 versions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 are
printed below.
The 1884 version states in the pertinent part:
Every original contractor, within sixty days after the completion of his contract,
and every person, save the original contractor, claiming the benefit of this Chapter,
must within thirty days after the completion of any building.. .file for record with
the county recorder of the county in which such property or some part thereof is
situated, a claim...
Laws of the Territory of Utah, Title IV, Chapter I, Sec. 1062.
The 1898 version states in the pertinent part:
Every original contractor within sixty days after the completion of his contract,
and every person save the original contractor claiming the benefit of this chapter,
must within forty days after furnishing the last material or performing the last
labor for any building, improvement, or structure... file for record with the county
recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated, a
claim in writing containing a nolice of intention to hold and claim a lien...
Section 1386, Chapter 1, Title 39 (Rev. St. 1898) also see Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin,
31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 715-716 (Utah 1906).
The 1953 version states in the pertinent part:

Every original contractor within eighty days after the completion of his contract,
and except as hereafter provided, every person other than the original contractor
claiming the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the last
8

material or performing the last labor for any land, building... must file for record
with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some party
thereof, is situated a claim in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and
claim a lien....
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1953).
The 2006 version states in the pertinent part:
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and
claim a lien within 90 days after the date of final completion of the original
contract under which the claimant claims a lien under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2006).
The 2008 version states in the pertinent part:
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and
claim a lien within:
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section
38-1-33.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008).
The 2009 version states in the pertinent part:
(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which
the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and
claim a lien no later than:
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or
(B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section
38-1-33 but not later than the time frame established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2009).

9

Every prior version of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute has had a specific and
easily definable time period in which to file a mechanics' lien notice. No version had a
time frame longer than 180 days to file a mechanics lien. The 2008 version was the first
version that included a separate time frame to file a mechanics' lien notice if a notice of
completion was filed. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008).
Given this history, Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of this statute is a drastic
departure from all prior and subsequent versions inasmuch as this is the only version,
according to Peterson Plumbing, that has an infinite time period to file a mechanics' lien
notice.
Appellees' Petition to Nullify the wrongful liens was heard before the District
Court was on October 8, 2008, just before the 2009 amendment (R. 323). The trial court
correctly interoperated Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) by holding that "the notice of
completion statute is intended to allow someone to give notice to all of the suppliers and
subcontractors and shorten the time from 180 days to 90 days to record a lien. So it's
supposed to be issued within that 180-day period early on in order to shorten that. That's
what the intent of that statute is, not to resurrect voided lien rights." (R. 279). That the
trial court correctly interpreted the 2008 statute is shown by the legislature clarifying this
statute in 2009, to make it readjust as the trial court held. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7
(2009).
However, Peterson Plumbing asserts that the "2009 amendment to Utah Code
Annotated § 38-1-7 is a substantive change and not a mere clarification of the law". See
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Brief of Appellant pg. 14. In support of this assertion, Peterson Plumbing cites to Hutter
v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, 219 P.3d 918. In Hutter, this Court stated:
While it is true that an amendment to an ambiguous statute may indicate a
legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change
the law, this is not the general rule, and this view of an amendment should be
taken only where there is a strong indication that clarification was, in fact, the
legislative intent.
Hutter, 2009 UT 69, ^f 16 (internal quotations omitted).
In the Hutter case, however, this Court found that there was no specific evidence
in that case that the legislature's intent was to clarify the statute. 2009 UT 69, ^ 16.
Moreover, this is a general rule, subject to clear instances of legislative intent otherwise.
See Id.
For example, in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998), the Court of
Appeals considered instances where a subsequent change to a statute was a clarification
rather than a substantive change. In Bryant, the Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he propriety of the trial court's interpretation is confirmed by a subsequent
amendment to section 76-5-405(1 )(b). After the trial in this case, the Legislature
rewrote the phrase, 'threatens the victim by use of a dangerous weapon,' to read,
'threatens the victim with use of a dangerous weapon.' An amendment which, in
effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative
declaration of the original act. Thus, when a statute is ambiguous, amendment of
the statute may indicate a legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the
statute rather than to change the law. Such an amendment may intimate that the
Legislature has become aware that the earlier language could be misconstrued as
defendants have done."
Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546 (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted).
Like Bryant, and unlike Hutter, there exists direct and specific evidence in this
case that a clarification was intended by the 2009 amendment and not a substantive
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change of the law. This is supported not only by statutory history of the Mechanics' Lien
Act as shown above, but also by the Senate Floor Debate regarding House Bill 154 that
amended Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008). Senator Jenkins stated in the floor debate,
On line 42, 90 days after the dale of the notice completed, but no later than the, it's
the 180 days that's on line 40. So it can be no later than the 180 days on line 40.
So, it's just a clarification.2
When speaking specifically about the exact phrase that was interpreted by the trial Court,
Senator Jenkins stated that it was a clarification and not a substantive change. This is
very strong evidence that the legislature realized that Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)
(2008) was ambiguous and could be misconstrued. Accordingly, the legislature decided
to clarify the 2008 statute with the new amendment.
Taking into account the statutory history and the Senator Jenkins' statements
regarding § 38-1-7, it is clear that the changes to the 2008 version was a clarification of
what the legislature originally intended and not a substantive change in the law. Thus,
the trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is supported by these
facts and should affirmed.
B. Peterson Plumbing's interpretation creates an absurd,
unreasonable and inoperable result, rendering the 180 day time
limit superfluous.
Where an interpretation "creates an absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable result, we
assume the legislature did not intend that result [and] endeavor to discover the underlying
legislative intent and interpret the statute accordingly." See State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57,

2

Senate Floor Debate, H.B. 154, 58th Leg , Gen. Sess. (February 27, 2009) (statements of
Senator Jenkins).
12

If 8, 217 P.3d 265. "One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that [we]
will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." In re Marriage of
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, If 23, 1 P.3d 1074.
Under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of the statute, a mechanics' lien notice
could theoretically be filed years, decades or even centuries after the completion of the
final contract and then resurrect the right to file a mechanics' lien notice for an additional
90 days. See Brief of Appellant pg. 12. However, as shown above, the mechanics' lien
statute has always provided a definite and determinable time period to file a mechanics'
lien notice. However, Peterson Plumbing argues that the 2008 version does not have any
determinable time frame in which a mechanics' lien can be filed. This interpretation
creates an absurd, unreasonable and inoperable result and this Court should assume that
the legislature did not intend such a result.
The absurdity of this argument is demonstrated when you consider that there are
numerous individuals and entities that can file a Notice of Completion with the State
Construction Registry pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-33. For example, an owner,
original contractor, lender, surety or a title company all have the statutory authority to file
a Notice of Completion. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-33(1 )(a)(i). Thus, it is possible that
any one of these individuals or entities could file a Notice of Completion long after the
180 day time limit, thus allowing (under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation) all potential
lien holders to resurrect their lien claims that had long since expired.
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Hypothetically, an individual could build a home and then sell the home to another
individual. That individual could pay in full for the home and sell it to another
individual. Then 20 years later, or even longer, a bank, a title company or some other
entity could file a notice of completion and all the potential lien claimants from many
years ago, whose lien rights had long since expired, could now file a mechanics' lien
notice on the home. Under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation, there would never be a
determinable time frame to when a mechanics' lien right would expire.
This result is absurd and was surely not the intent of the legislature, especially
considering that the mechanics' lien statute has always provided a determinable and set
time frame limiting when a mechanics' lien could be filed. The legislature surely did not
intend to create a situation where mechanics' liens could be filed indefinitely.
Given that statutes are to be interpreted to give meaning to all parts, and avoid
rendering portions of the statute superfluous, Peterson Plumbing's interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) is not correct since it renders portions of the statute
superfluous. See Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, ^ 16, 89 P.3d 113. Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008) states that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed within "180
days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no notice
of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33". Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008)
(emphasis added). If Peterson Plumbing's interpretation were correct, there would be no
reason to have the 180 day limitation language in the Statute. The legislature could have
simple said that a mechanics' lien notice must be filed within 90 days after the filing of
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the notice of completion. The 180 day language is rendered superfluous under Peterson
Plumbing's interpretation.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (2008)
by holding that the filing of a notice of completion could only shorten the time frame to
file a mechanics' lien from 180 days to 90 days, but could not lengthen the time past the
180 days. Therefore, Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were filed untimely
and were void ab initio.
IL

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETERSON
PLUMBING'S MECHANICS5 LIENS WERE WRONGFUL LIENS

Peterson Plumbing contends that their mechanics' lien notices were expressly
authorized by statute and that they were entitled to a lien under Utah Code Ann § 38-1-3.
See Brief of Appellant pg. 15-27. Peterson Plumbing's argument is mistaken and has
failed to consider all portions of the relevant statutes. The trial court correctly ruled that
Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not expressly authorized by statute and
were therefore wrongful (R. 280-278).
A, Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not expressly
authorized by statute.
Peterson Plumbing quotes extensively from the Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69,
to support its assertion that its mechanics' lien notices were "expressly authorized
by.. .statute," and therefore not wrongful liens. See Brief of Appellant pg. 16-19. The
Hutter case did hold that Dig-It's mechanics' lien was "expressly authorized by statute"
in that case and therefore not a wrongful lien. Hutter, 2009 UT 69, \ 52. However, this
does not mean that any document created or filed purporting to be a mechanics' lien is
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expressly authorized by statute. The Hutter case is distinguishable because it did not
involve the vital element of timely filing a mechanics' lien notice.
The Court of Appeals addressed this specific issue when it stated, "The wrongful
lien statute declares: This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under
Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. Thus,
the statute is not so broad as to exempt any filing that purports to arise under the
mechanics1 lien statute. Instead, section 38-9-2(3) only excludes persons 'entitled' to a
mechanics' lien." Foothill Park, LCv. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App. 113, % 19, 182 P.3d
924 (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Utah Wrongful Lien Act also provides that a wrongful lien is
determined at the time it is recorded or filed. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6)
(2008) provides:
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or
another state or federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) (emphasis added).
In Foothill, the Court of Appeals further stated that whether a person is "entitled to
a lien" is determined at the time the notice is filed. Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT App.
113, If 20. Peterson Plumbing concedes that the Foothill case holds that an untimely
mechanics' lien is in fact a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute. See
Brief of Appellant pg. 20.
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This Court recently interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) and stated:
This legislative history makes clear that the legislature intended that the definition
of "wrongful lien" should encompass only common law liens. Therefore, we
conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized by ... statute" in the Wrongful
Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that ultimately prove
unenforceable. Because Dig-It filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly
authorized by statute, the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above,
is not wrongful...
Hutter, 2009 UT 69, % 52 (emphasis added). Upon first glance, the Foothill and Hutter
cases seem to be incompatible. However, the cases are distinguishable.
In Foothill, the Court dealt with a timeliness issue. Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT
App. 113, ^ 6-11. "Compliance with the statute is required before a party is entitled to
the benefits created by the statute. If a party does not comply with the statutory deadline
for enforcement, the lien right perishes inchoate and all of a party's rights and remedies
under the mechanics' lien statute are extinguished." Foothill Park, LCv. Judston, Inc.,
2008 UT App. 113, ^|6 (punctuation and citations omitted).
In Hutter, however, this Court dealt with a mechanics' lien that was determined to
be invalid because no preliminary notice was filed by the lien claimant; not a timelines of
the filing of the mechanics' lien notice. Hutter, 2009 UT 69, f 2. This Court stated in
Hutter that, "the Wrongful Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that
ultimately prove unenforceable." Id. 1{52 (emphasis added). Therefore, pursuant to
Hutter, an untimely mechanics' lien is still a wrongful lien because there is no statutory
right to file a belated mechanics' lien.
The importance of the timeliness of filing a lien is demonstrated in two Utah Court
of Appeals cases regarding the filing of a lis pendens. A lis pendens is a statutory created
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lien that allows a party to record a lien on real property on an "action affecting the title to,
or the right to possession of, real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303. A lis
pendens is a statutory lien and not a common law lien.
Even though a lis pendens is a statutory lien and specifically authorized in the
Wrongful Lien Statute at Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2) (2008), the Utah Court of Appeals
has held that it still can be a wrongful lien pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Statute if it is
not timely filed. In DougJessop Const, Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT APP 348, t 19, 195
P.3d 493, the Court of Appeals held that a lis pendens was a wrongful lien because it
preceded the filing of the counterclaim and was therefore not timely filed.
Also, in Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243,ffif46-50, 166 P.3d 639, the
Court of Appeals again considered if an invalid lis pendens could be a wrongful lien. In
Farnsworth the Court of Appeals stated that "Section 38-9-1 requires a court to
determine whether a lien is wrongful by evaluating it 'at the time it is recorded or filed'."
Id. \ 50. In Farnsworth, the lien was deemed to not be a wrongful lien because the lis
pendens was filed timely and therefore expressly authorized by the statute.
These two lis pendens cases perfectly demonstrate the importance of a lien being
timely filed. If a lien is not timely filed it can be a wrongful lien under the Wrongful
Lien Statute. In the current case Peterson Plumbing did not timely file its notice of
mechanics' lien (R. 93-94, 320-22). The lien was filed more than 180 days after
completion of the final contract (R. 93-94, 320-22). Therefore, at the time of the filing of
the lien, Peterson Plumbing was not "expressly authorized by .. .statute" to file the
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mechanics lien notices. Accordingly, once the 180 day passed, Peterson Plumbing had
no statutory right to file a lien, period. Thus, its lien notices were wrongful.
B. Peterson Plumbing was not entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(3) (2008) states, "This chapter does not apply to a
person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38,
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens." (emphasis added). Peterson Plumbing asserts that the
Court of Appeals in Foothill misinterpreted the above statute. See Brief of Appellant pg.
20. Peterson Plumbing claims that the Court of Appeals inappropriately "isolated the
phrase 'entitled to a lien' from the phrase 'entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3". See
Brief of Appellant pg. 20. Peterson Plumbing then contends, "As a result, the Court of
Appeals defined entitlement to a mechanics' lien generally in the overall context of lien
validity under the entire Mechanics' Lien Act, including the filing provisions set forth in
Utah Code § 38-1-7 and 38-1-11, rather than by reference to 'section 38-1-3'." See Brief
of Appellant pg. 20-21. Peterson Plumbing then claims that the Court of Appeals
interpretation renders the phrase "under section 38-1-3" superfluous and inoperative.
This argument is erroneous. The Court of Appeals decision in Foothill does not
render the phrase "under section 38-1-3" superfluous and inoperative. In fact, it is
Peterson Plumbing's own interpretation that renders the remaining portion of Utah Code
Ann. § 38-9-2(3) superfluous.
Peterson Plumbing completely ignores the remaining portion of Utah Code Ann. §
38-9-2(3) that states, "who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens."
The statute has two prongs, the first of which requires the lien claimant to be "entitled to
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a lien under section 38-1-3" and the second prong requires the lien claimant to file a lien
"pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens." Peterson pluming does not consider
the second prong of this statute. A lien must be timely filed to be filed "pursuant to Title
38, Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens." See Foothill Park, LC, 2008 UT App. 113,ffi[6-11.
Since Peterson Plumbing's mechanics' lien notices were not filed pursuant to Title 38,
Chapter 1 Mechanics' Liens, they are not exempt from the wrongful lien statute.
Peterson Plumbing further asserts that the proper interpretation "leads to a threeprong test for determining whether a lien claimant is 'entitled' to a mechanics' lien. (1)
the lien claimant must be identifiable as a contractor, subcontractor, licensed architect, or
as belonging to one of the other groups identified in Utah Code § 38-1-3; (2) the lien
claimant must have 'rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials
or equipment' upon the property; and (3) the work performed must have been performed
'at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise." See Brief of Appellant pg. 22. Peterson Plumbing states that if
these three prongs are met then the lien claimant is entitled to a lien, regardless if the lien
is timely or not.
Appellees agree with the Peterson Plumbing's three-prong test but the test should
include an additional fourth prong that a mechanics' lien notice must be timely filed.
This interpretation would be consistent with the Foothill case, the Anderton case, with
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(3) (2008), and with Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (2008). This
additional prong would almost certainly be the easiest and quickest to determine of all the
prongs. If a notice of completion was filed with the State Construction Registry then the
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mechanics' lien would have to be filed within 90 calendar days of the notice of
completion but no more than 180 days of completion of the original contract. If no notice
of completion was filed with the State Construction Registry then the lien claimant would
have 180 calendar days from final completion of the original contract. Final completion
of the original contract will almost always be determined by the certificate of occupancy
filed on the property. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7. To determine if the fourth-prong is
met would require a simple procedure of counting the calendar days after the completion
of the original contract or after the notice of completion was filed. The other prongs
would certainly not be so easy to determine. If there was a dispute on whether or not a
lien claimant actually worked on the property or if he did so at the instance of the owner
it would most likely require a fact finding hearing with testimony and numerous
witnesses. The easiest prong to determine would be the timeliness of the filing.
Lastly, if Peterson Plumbing's three-prong test was accepted without the fourthprong, innocent homeowners could face severe consequences. Under Peterson
Plumbing's interpretation, a contractor who did work on the property at the instance of
the owner could theoretically file a mechanics' lien notice at any time without any danger
of it being a wrongful lien, even if the contractor filed the lien for purely malicious
purposes. A contractor could wait 10 years or more and file a mechanics' lien out of
spite right before a home owner was going to sell the home or refinance. The home
owner would have no speedy remedy to remove the mechanics' lien from the property
without the option of the Wrongful Lien Statute. The lien claimant has 180 days to file
suit to foreclose on the mechanics' lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11. Without the
21

Wrongful Lien Remedies, the home owner would be forced to wait the 180 days to see if
the lien claimant files suit. During that 180 day period the sale of the home would most
likely fail or the homeowner could fail to refinance. The homeowner could possibly sue
the contractor for damages but the conclusion of that would take many months and the
harm caused by the wrongful lien would have already taken place.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the reasons stated above, Appellees respectfully request this Court to affirm
the trial court's holding that Utah Code Ann. § 38-7-1 does not indefinitely extend the
right to file a mechanics' lien notice. In addition, Appellees respectfully request this
Court to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2), which
provides for attorney's fees and costs if a wrongful lien is not removed, and Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-18, which provides that a party who successfully defends against a
mechanics' lien is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. Appellees further ask that this
matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court for a determination of damages pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S d a y of April, 2010.

Paul D. Dodd
Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008).
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to
such interest as the owner may have in the property.

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2007).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2007).
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within
90 days after the date of final completion of the original contract under which the
claimant claims a lien under the chapter, (ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), final
completion of the original contract means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the
original contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date
of issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity
having jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is
required by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project,
but as a result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required
as per state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the
work by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or
(C) if with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of
occupancy and no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the
local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on
which there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the
original contract.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B),
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original
contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term "substantial work'5 does not include: (i)
repair work; or (ii) warranty work.
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding
payment to ensure completion of that work.
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii)
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material
was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of

the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3,
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance
with Section 38-11-107.
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to
hold and claim a lien.
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property;
or (ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix).

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008).
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property,
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within:
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no
notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which
a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. (ii) For purposes of this Subsection
(1), final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or (C) if
with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and
no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which
there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original
contract.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B),
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original
contractor's time frame to file a nolice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work.
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i)
repair work; or (ii) warranty work.
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding
payment to ensure completion of that work.
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii)
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material

was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of
the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3,
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance
with Section 38-11-107.
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to
hold and claim a lien.
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property;
or (ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix).

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2009).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2009).
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under
this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the
property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien
no later than: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the
day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33 but not later than the
time frame established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A). (ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1),
final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; (C) if with
regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and no
final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local government
entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which there remains
no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original contract; or (D) if
as a result of termination of the original contract prior to the completion of the work
defined by the original contract, the compliance agency does not issue a certificate of
occupancy or final inspection, the last date on which substantial work was performed
under the original contract.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B),
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the
sole purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of
intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original
contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this
Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work.
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i)
repair work; or (ii) warranty work.
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(C), final completion of the original
contract does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is
holding payment to ensure completion of that work
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the

name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii)
the name of the person:(A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom the
lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first and
last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material was
furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification (v) the name,
current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of the
lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent;
(viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording
of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 3811-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section
38-11-107.
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to
hold and claim a lien.
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property;
or (ii) the record owner of the real property.
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located.
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees
against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix).

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-33 (2008)

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-33 (2008).
(1) (a) Upon final completion of a construction project:
(i) an owner of a construction project or an original contractor may file a notice of
completion with the database; and
(ii) a lender that has provided financing for the construction project, a surety that has
provided bonding for the construction project, or a title company issuing a title insurance
policy on the construction project, may file a notice of completion.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, if a subcontractor performs substantial work after
the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii), that subcontractor's
subcontract is considered an original contract for the sole purpose of determining:
(i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice to hold and claim a lien under
Subsection 38-1-7(1); and
(ii) the original contractor's time frame to file a notice to hold and claim a lien under
Subsection 38-1-7(1) for that subcontractor's work.
(c) A notice of completion shall include:
(i) the building permit number for the project, or the number assigned to the project by
the designated agent;
(ii) the name, address, and telephone number of the person filing the notice of
completion;
(iii) the name of the original contractor for the project;
(iv) the address of the project or a description of the location of the project;
(v) the date on which final completion is alleged to have occurred; and
(vi) the method used to determine final completion.
(d) For purposes of this section, final completion of the original contract does not
occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding payment to ensure
completion of the work.
(e) (i) Unless a person indicates to the division or designated agent that the person
does not wish to receive a notice under this section, electronic notification of the filing of
a notice of completion or alternate notice as prescribed in Subsection (l)(a), shall be
provided to:
(A) each person that filed a notice of commencement for the project;
(B) each person that filed preliminary notice for the project; and
(C) all interested persons who have requested notices concerning the project.
(ii) A person to whom notice is required under this Subsection (1) (e) is responsible
for:
(A) providing an e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which a notice
required by this Subsection (l)(e) is to be sent; and
(B) the accuracy of any e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which
notice is to be sent.
(iii) The designated agent fulfills the notice requirement of Subsection (1) (e)(i) when
it sends the notice to the e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number provided to
the designated agent, whether or not the notice is actually received.

(iv) Upon the filing of a notice of completion, the time periods for filing preliminary
notices stated in Section 38-1-27 are modified such that all preliminary notices shall be
filed subsequent to the notice of completion and within ten days from the day on which
the notice of completion is filed.
(f) A subcontract that is considered an original contract for purposes of this section
does not create a requirement for an additional preliminary notice if a preliminary notice
has already been given for the labor, service, equipment, and material furnished to the
subcontractor who performs substantial work.
(2) (a) If a construction project owner, original contractor, subcontractor, or other
interested person believes that a notice of completion has been filed erroneously, that
owner, original contractor, subcontractor, or other interested person can request from the
person who filed the notice of completion evidence establishing the validity of the notice
of completion.
(b) Within ten days after the request described in Subsection (2)(a), the person who
filed the notice of completion shall provide the requesting person proof that the notice of
completion is valid.
(c) If the person that filed the notice of completion does not provide proof of the
validity of the notice of completion, that person shall immediately cancel the notice of
completion from the database in any manner prescribed by the division pursuant to rule.
(3) A person filing a notice of completion by alternate filing is responsible for
verifying and changing any incorrect information in the notice of completion before the
expiration of the time period during which the notice is required to be filed.

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008).
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or
beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real properly who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the
property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest,
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by
the owner of the real property.

ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008).
(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on
or after May 5, 1997. (b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens
of record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed, (c) Notwithstanding
Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a
notice of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed before May 5, 2008.
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in
accordance with Section 78B-6-1303 or seeking any other relief permitted by law.
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter I, Mechanics' Liens.
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MECHANICS' L I E N S
arc concurrent as to one fund, 36 A. L. E.
663.
Time when contractor commenced work
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or time when labor or material for which
lien is claimed was furnished as date of
mechanic's lien, 83 A. L. R. 925.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
1.

Commencement and duration of lien.
Under former statute, lien of subcontractor attached on date of subcontractor's
commencing 1o do work or to furnish ma-

tcrials. Morrison v. Inter-Mountain Salt
Co.. 14 V. 201, 46 P. .1104, following Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33
P. 238.

38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of original contractor or subcontractor.—No attachment, garnishment or levy under an execution upon
any money due to an original contractor from the owner of any property
subject to lien under this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a
subcontractor or materialman, and no such attachment, garnishment or
levy upon any money due to a subcontractor or materialman from the
contractor shall be valid as against any lien of a laborer employed by the
day or piece.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907,
§1380; C. L. 1917, §3730; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-6.
"
Comparable Provision.
Iowa Code Ann., § 572.19 (mechanics'
liens take priority of all garnishments
of owner for contract debts, whether
made prior or subsequent to commencement of furnishing of material or performance of labor, without regard to
date of filing claim for such lien).
Collateral References.
Mechanics' Liens<2=>198.
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 197.
Character of service contemplated by
statutes giving a lien or preference, in
event of insolvency, to servants, employees, laborers, etc., 142 A. L. R. 362.
Constitutionality of statute giving to
lien for alteration of property, pursuant
to public requirement, preference over preexisting mechanic's lien or similar lien, 121
A. L. R. 616, 141 A. L. R. 66.
Lien for labor or material furnished under contract with vendor pending execu-

tory contract, for sale of property as affeeling purchaser's interest, 47 A. L. B .
263.
Priority as between artisan's lien and
chattel mortgage, 36 A. L. R. 2d 229.
Priority as between lien for repairs and
right of seller under conditional sales
contract, 30 A. L. R. 2d 198.
Priority as between mechanic's lien and
purchase-money mortgage, 72 A. L. B .
1516, 73 A. L. R. 2d 1407.
Priority as between mortgage for future
advances and mechanics' liens, 80 A. L.
j>. 2d 179.
Remedy available to holder of mechanic's lien which has priority over antecedent
mortgage or vendor's title or lien as regards improvement, but not as regards
laud, where it is impossible or impractical
to remove the improvement, 107 A. L. R.
1012.
Right or interest subject to, and priority
of, statutory lien for labor or material in
developing property for oil and gas, 122
A. L. R. 1182.
Rule as to marshaling assets where liens
are concurrent as to one fund, 36 A. L.
R. 663.

38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording.—Every original contractor within eighty days after the completion of his contract, and except
as hereafter provided, every person other than the original contractor
claiming the benefit of this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the
last material or performing the last labor for or on any land, building,
improvement or structure, or for any alteration, addition to or repair
thereof, or performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for,
any mine or mining claim, must file for record with the county recorder of
the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is situated a claim
in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and claim a lien, and
a statement of his demand after deducting all just credits and offsets,
913
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with the name of the owner, if known, and also the name of the person by
whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the material, with a statement of the terms, time given and conditions of his contract, specifyin»
the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first and last
material was furnished, and also a description of the property to be
charged with the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must be
verified by the oath of himself or of some other person.
When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as
stated above at the instance and request of an original contractor, then
such subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set forth herein, are extended so as to make the final date for the filing of a notice of intention;
to hold and claim a lien sixty days after completion of the original contract
of the original contractor.
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907,
§1386; C. I*. 1917, §3736; L. 1931, ch. 6,
§ 1; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-7; L. 1949,
ch. 63, § 1.
Compiler's Note.
The 1949 amendment
paragraph.

added

the

5.

Perfection of lien in general.
Lion is not created until contractor files
for record the statement and notice required by law. Elwell v. Morrow, 28 U
278, 78 P . 605.

last

Comparable Provisions.
California Civ. Proc. Code, § 1193.1,
subd. (c) (must file notice of completion
of work for record; if filed, original contractor has sixty days in which to file
claim, all others, t h i r t y d a y s ; if not filed,
claim must be filed ninety days after completion of w o r k ) .
Idaho Code Ann., § 45-507 (substantially
the same, except t h a t original contractor
must file "within ninety d a y s " ) .
Iowa Code Ann., §§ 572.8, 572.9 (similar;
principal contractor must file within ninety
days; subcontractor, within sixty d a y s ) .
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §45-502
(every person must file "within ninety
days").
1.

In general.
Cited in Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., 7
IT. (2d) 148, 320 P. 2d 661.

2.

"Person" defined.
The word "person" in this section includes a corporation. Doane v. Clinton,
2 IT. 417.

3.

Operation and effect of section.
This section gives the subcontractor a
lien, and it also gives a lien to the person who performs labor on the building,
or furnishes material under a contract
with such subcontractor. Teahen v. Kelson,
6 U. 363, 23 P . 764.
4.

his right to lien. Brubaker v. Bennett 19
U. 401, 57 P . 170.

Compliance with section.
Nothing more than compliance with the
provisions of this section can be required
of claimant in order for him to secure

Sufficiency of notice.
Essential averments, omitted in notice
of lien, were incapable of being supplied
b y averments in complaint or b y extrinsic
evidence. Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 53 P . 832, 70 Am. St. Rep.
784.
Any notice which conforms to provisions
of this section is sufficient. Brubaker v.
Bennett, 19 U. 401, 57 P . 170.
Notice of intention to claim lien for
materials furnished for erection of two
buildings was not insufficient on ground
t h a t amount due on each one of buildings
was not separately stated. Eccles Lumber
Co. v. M a r t i n , 31 U. 241, 87 P . 713.
For purpose of acquiring mechanic's
lien against mining claims where operated as mine, necessary appurtenances^
including easement in adjoining ^ land,
were not required to be mentioned in notice of intention to claim lien. P a r k City
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver King Min.
Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P . 254.
Necessary appurtenances, including easement which extended outside of boundaries
of land upon which building was erected,
were not required to be mentioned in notice of intention to claim lien. Park City
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver King Min.
Co., 36 IT. 145, 103 P . 254.
A notice of lien by materialman, which
clearly showed t h a t building materials
were furnished owner, and used on and
about house on land fully and legally described by lot and subdivision, and which
recited t h a t owner agreed to pay cash,
was sufficient to substantially comply with
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MECHANICS'
this section. Chase v. Dawson, 117 U. 295,
215 P . 2d 390.
Where the basic requirements of creating a lien are met it is not essential t h a t
the names of others whoso interests might
be affected be listed on the notices of the
lien. Buehner Block Co. -v. Glezos, 6 IT.
(2d) 226, 310 P . 2d 517.
Where labor is performed or mat d i a l s
furnished upon several buildings owned
by the same person or peisons, a claimant
may include in one claim all amounts due,
and the claim will not be defective if the
amount due on each separate building is
not designated. Utali Savings & Loan
Assn. v. Mecham, 12 U. (2d) 335, 366 P .
2d 598.
If a claimant files a lien against more
than one piece of property belonging to
the same owner without designating the
amount due on each building or improvement, he may enforce the lien against the
owner; however, if there are other lien
claimants of the same class, his claim is
subordinate to theirs if the claims of the
latter are against only one of the buildings or if they complied with 38-1-8. Utah
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Mecham, 12 U.
(2d) 335, 366 P . 2d 598.
7.

—subcontractor's notice.
Subcontractor's notice of claim of lien
held insufficient as against owner of property on which lien was claimed. Morrison,
Merrill & Co. v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 53 P .
832, 70 Am. St. Rep. 784.
Subcontractor is not required to state,
in his notice, any of terms or conditions
of contract between owner and original
contractor. Brubakcr v. Bennett, 39 U.
401, 57 P . 170.
8.

—time of filing.
Mechanic's lien filed within time specified by this section takes effect as of date
of commencement of work and furnishing
of materials, and is prior to intervening
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 IT. 379, 85
P . 363, 85 P . 1012.
Under this section, where an owner exercised his contract right to change contractors, a mechanic's lien notice is in
time when filed over sixty days after the
first contractor quit, but within sixty
days after delivering material to the second contractor, for the contract is continuing. Langton Lime & Cement Co. v.
Pcery, 48 U. 112, 159 P . 49.
Plaintiff, who contended that project
was not finally completed until ii November, 1962, although defendant asserted
that all work done by plaintiff was completed during the spring of 1962, had the
burden of demonstrating t h a t his lien
was filed within the eighty-day period on
appeal to t h e Supreme Court where the
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trial court resolved
the
controversy
against the plaintiff, ruling that his claim
of lien was invalid. Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. (2d) 125, 405 P . 2d 346.
9.

—time of
filing—extension.
Under this section it is important to
determine when contract was "completed,"
and when the "last m a t e r i a l " was furnished, or the "last labor" performed, for
until such is the case the time has not
begun to run as prescribed hereunder, but
time to file notice is extended until such
is the case. See Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 U.
503, 56 P . 2d 1.
The element of work done at the owner's request has had considerable weight
in w*orking an extension of time. Where
materials are furnished or labor performed at owner's request to remedy defects, the question of bad faith on p a r t
of lien claimant is eliminated. Wilcox v.
Cloward, 88 U. 503, 56 P . 2d 1.
A leaky roof needing a hundred shingles
to repair it, and a plumbing contract
where the range boiler still needed to be
connected up, are not "trivial imperfections" b u t constitute work within purview of claimant's contract so as to extend
the time for filing the notice of lien.
Such as this constitutes work done satisfactorily to complete a contract, and without which the owner would not be required
to accept the job. Wilcox v. Cloward, 88
U. 503, 56 P . 2d 1.
Time to complete small jobs incidental
to completion of contracted obligations
was sufficient to extend time to file notice
of lien under this section providing such
small jobs were necessary and not invented to merelv extend the s t a t u t o r y period.
Totorica v."Thomas, 16 U. (2d) 175, 397
P . 2d 984.
10. Statement of demand.
I t is evident t h a t the filing of the statement does not create the lien, but simply
holds it or keeps it in force for the period
of twelve months as provided in 38-1-11,
so as to give the claimant an opportunity
to enforce the same by process of law.
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70,
33 P . 238.
Lien claimant must substantially comply with all of requirements of statute in
btatemeut of his claim for lien, and in
all essenti.il particulars such statement
must be true. Morrison, Merrill & Co.
v. Willard, 17 U. 306, 53 P. 832, 70 Am.
St. Bep. 784.
11. Scope and extent of lien.
Owner, in his dealings with contractor,
is charged with notice that subcontractor
is entitled, under his subcontract, to lien
within limits of original contract price.
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Laws of the Territory of Utah, Title IV, Chapter I, Sec, 1062
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Supreme Court of Utah.
ECCLES LUMBER CO.
v.
MARTIN et al.
Nov. 14, 1906.
Appeal from District Court, Weber County; J. A.
Howell, Judge.
Action by the Eccles Lumber Company against Ann
H. Martin, executrix of James E. Horrocks, deceased,
and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff
appeals. Reversed and remanded.
*714 T. D. Skeen, for appellant.
T. N. Kimball, for respondents.
FRICK, J.
This action was commenced to foreclose a mechanic's
lien; judgment of dismissal being entered upon a demurrer to the complaint. With the hope of assisting to
a better understanding of the views herein after expressed, we will, in our own way, make a somewhat
extended statement of the facts contained in the complaint, which, after stating the corporate existence of
the appellant, is, in substance, as follows:
That James E. Horrocks, during his lifetime, and at all
times mentioned in the complaint, was the owner in
fee of certain real estate in Ogden City, Utah, described as follows: Part of lot twenty-seven (27), block
four (4), of South Ogden survey addition to Ogden
City, Weber county, Utah, to wit, beginning at the
northwest corner of said lot twenty-seven (27); thence
east 162 feet; thence south 132 feet; thence west 30
feet; thence north 66 feet; thence west 132 feet; thence
north 66 feet to the place of beginning. That on or
about the 1st day of September, 1904, said Horrocks
entered into a written contract with respondent Peterson, whereby said Peterson agreed to build for said
Horrocks two frame dwelling houses upon the real
estate above described, and to furnish and provide all
of the lumber, building material, and labor necessary
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to complete said houses, and to complete the same on
or before the 1st day of November, 1904, all for *715
the sum of $2,750, to be paid by said Horrocks to said
Peterson; payment to be made in installments as the
work on said houses progressed, and the last payment
of $500 was to be made when said houses were fully
completed. That thereafter, on the 6th day of September, 1904, said Peterson, by a written contract,
sublet the construction of said houses, together with
the furnishing of certain specified material, to the
respondent Fred. Howard. Said Howard agreed to
complete said houses within 36 working days from
said date, and to receive the sum of $1,575 for what he
agreed to do, payments to be made from time to time,
the last payment of $775 to be made when said houses
were completed. That thereafter, on the 19th day of
September, 1904, said Howard entered into a contract
with appellant, whereby appellant agreed to furnish
said Howard with lumber and other specified material
necessary to complete said houses. That in pursuance
of said agreement, and with the assent and approval of
said Peterson, the original contractor, and said Horrocks, the owner of the premises above described,
appellant, between the 19th day of September and the
25th day of October, 1904, sold, furnished, and delivered said building material to said Howard upon said
premises to be and which was actually used in the
construction of said houses, amounting in all, according to the prices agreed upon, and after deducting
all credits, to the sum of $710.48. That said contracts
were entire, and appellant is unable to state the amount
due or the sum paid on each of said houses separately.
That the appellant furnished all the lumber and
building material required to complete said houses.
That the same was to be paid for on the 1st day of the
month succeeding the date of delivery. That no payments were made for the construction work of said
houses before the first material was actually furnished
by the appellant, except the sum of $600. That within
40 days from the date of delivery of the last material,
the appellant filed with the county recorder of Weber
county, and caused to be recorded, a notice of intention to claim, and did claim, a mechanic's lien upon the
real estate above described. The notice so filed and
recorded was duly verified, and in detail complied
with the requirements of section 1386, Rev. St. 1898,
all of which is stated in the complaint. That said
Horrocks died on the 20th day of March, 1905, leaving
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a last will, wherein the respondent Ann H. Martin was
named as executrix, which will was thereafter on the
29th day of June, 1905, duly admitted to probate, and
that letters testamentary were duly issued to said Ann
H. Martin, and that she is the duly qualified executrix
of the last will of said James E. Horrocks, deceased.
That the appellant duly presented its claim for the
amount claimed, with interest and costs, to said executrix for allowance against said estate. That the
same was disallowed and rejected by her, and she
refused to pay the same or any part thereof. A copy of
the notice of intention to claim a lien is attached to said
complaint, and made a part thereof. The notice sets
forth in detail all matters required by section 1386,
Rev. St 1898, but fails to state the amount due to the
claimant on each building separately.
Upon substantially the foregoing facts, the appellant
prayed judgment for the amount of its claim, to foreclose said lien, for the sale of the property, and for
general relief To this complaint the respondent Ann
H. Martin, as executrix of the said last will, interposed
a general demurrer upon the sole ground that said
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action either against her or the estate of the
deceased, and that the facts stated are insufficient to
entitle appellant to the relief prayed for. The trial court
sustained this demurrer, and the appellant, refusing to
further amend the complaint, but electing to stand
thereon, judgment dismissing the action and for costs
was directed to be rendered against the appellant, from
which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The only question presented by this record therefore
is, did the court err in sustaining said demurrer and in
entering judgment dismissing the action as above
stated'? The trial court held that the notice of intention
to claim a lien was insufficient, for the reason that the
amount due on each one of the two houses was not
separately stated, and that therefore there was no lien,
and hence the judgment dismissing the action. In order
to determine the correctness of the court's ruling, it
becomes necessary to analyze and construe sections
1386 and 1387, c. 1, tit. 39, Rev. St. 1898, entitled
"Mechanics' Liens." This chapter is composed of 28
sections consecutively numbered from 1373 to
1400. In those sections is contained an entire system
or scheme respecting the creation of mechanics' liens
in favor of persons who furnish any material, or perform any labor, or render any skill or service for any
improvements on land. By the various amendments to
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the original law from time to time, and as the same has
been construed by this and other courts under similar
statutes, a mechanic's lien attaches to the land, and,
unless the person against whom the claim for a mechanic's lien is made has some interest or estate in the
land upon which the improvement is made, no lien
attaches to the improvement as such; further, that a
contract express or implied must have been made with
the owner of the land or his authorized agent in order
to successfully initiate a lien. Morrison, Merrill &
Co. v. Clark. 20 Utah, 432, 59 Pac 235, 77 Am St.
Rep. 924:Earlv v. Burt, 68 Iowa, 716, 28 N. W.
35;Huff v. Jolly, 41 Kan. 537, 21 Pac. 646;Fetter v.
Wilson, 51 Kv. 90;Wagar v. Btiscoe, 38 Mich.
587-595. The case of *716Sanford v. Kunkel (Utah)
85 Pac. 363, in no way departs from the doctrine that
in order to acquire a lien an interest in the real estate
upon which the improvements are made is necessary.
That case is based upon the sound equitable doctrine
that where the law has given a right to one person it
cannot be destroyed by the wrongful act of another.
Having thus reached the conclusion that under our
present statute a mechanic's lien can only be acquired
on land, and that the buildings or improvements are to
be taken as appurtenant merely, we will proceed to an
examination of our statutes to determine whether the
lien in question is void or valid. Section 1386, in
which are,Q08£aiaed the matters .which jcajist be stated
in a n o t i c e ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f loj|s; "Every^origMl contractor, w ^ ^ ^ f f i ^ ^ ^ y s
a^r4^£cptople$ion of his7<:ontract, and ev.eryfp8Sbn
save the original contractor claiming the benefit of this
chapter, must, within forty days after furnishing the
lasl material or performing' the last labor for any
building, improvement, or structure, or for any alteration, addition to, or repair thereof, or performance of
any labor in or furnishing any materials for any mining
claim, file for record with the county recorder of the
county in which the property or some part thereof is
situated, a claim in writing containing a notice of
intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement of
his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets,
with the name of the owner, if known, and also the
name of the person by whom he was employed, or to
whom he furnished the material, with a statement of
the terms, time given, and conditions of his contract,
specifying the time when the first and last labor was
performed, or the first and last material furnished, and
also a description of the property to be charged with
the lien, sufficient for identification, which claim must
be verified by the oath of himself or of some other
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person." This is followed by section 1387, which is as
follows: "Liens against two or more buildings, mining
claims, or other improvements owned by the same
person or persons may be included in one claim; but in
such case the person filing the claim must designate
therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each of
such buildings, mining claims, or other improvements." These sections must be construed in connection with each other, and the two together must be
construed in connection with other provisions contained in the whole of chapter 1 aforesaid. In order to
arrive at the true legislative intent, courts cannot segregate a section or a part of an entire chapter upon a
given subject, and from such part alone determine the
true meaning or intent of the whole. Moreover, the
object or purpose of the law as a whole must be considered. If often occurs that, in a series of sections
relating to one subject, provisions are found in one or
more sections that are in seeming conflict with other
sections or parts of the same act. It also occurs that in
an act like chapter 1, aforesaid, where rights are
created, the methods to secure them are prescribed,
and the procedure provided for to enforce such rights
as against the property, the owner, and among other
claimants, certain provisions may be intended to affect
some and not others. Some of these provisions may be,
and frequently are, intended for the benefit of some
who may stand in a particular relation, and not to
others standing in a different relation to either the
owner or the property. This is the case with respect to
our mechanic's lien law, as we shall attempt to show.
Moreover, as is well stated in Boisot on Mechanics'
Liens, § 4: "The doctrine upon which the lien is
founded is the consideration of natural justice, that a
party who has enhanced the value of property by incorporating therein his labor or materials shall have a
preferred claim on such property for the value of his
labor or materials." But the respondent contends, and
the contention is sound, that a mechanic's lien is
purely statutory, not contractual, and none can be
acquired unless the claimant has complied with the
several provisions of the statute creating the lien. We
yield full assent to this doctrine, and likewise assent
that, where the statute fails, courts cannot create
rights, and should not do so by unnatural and forced
construction. But, while all this is sound doctrine,
courts should not withhold the benefits intended by a
series of sections on one subject by a too literal or
strict construction of one section, or part of the whole
series, so as to destroy intended effects of other parts.
It is the true intent and spirit contained in all the sec-
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tions upon a given subject that constitutes the law
upon that subject, not what may be contained in only
one of them. The rule that in our judgment should
govern, is, we think, correctly stated in 20 Am. & Eng.
Ency. Law, on page 276, where the author says: "A
lien once acquired by labor performed on a building
with the consent of the owner should not, however, be
defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are
infringed, and no express command of the statute is
disregarded." With these rules and principles in mind,
we are prepared to proceed to an analysis of sections
1386 and 1387. Such an analysis becomes necessary,
for the reason that this court has in no case that we are
aware of, either done so or attempted to do so. True,
the question was raised in the case of Garner v. Van
Patten, 20 Utah, 342, 58 Pac. 684, but, as the court in
that case sustained the lien, although, as appears from
the case, the claimant had not strictly complied with
the provisions of section 1387, the question here presented, if decided at all, was adverse to the respondent
in this case. The question in this case *717 is, can a
claimant obtain a valid lien as against an owner of
property upon which the lien is claimed without including the statement required by section 1387? We
think he can, for the following reasons:
It will be observed that by the provisions of section
1386, wherein are prescribed the necessary acts to be
done by the claimant to acquire a lien, it is provided
among other things that the claimant shall make "a
statement of his demand after deducting all just credits
and offsets." The owner is thus fairly informed of the
amount claimed against his property. If the amount is
correct, he will have this amount to pay-no more, no
less-to discharge the lien. If it is incorrect, he is fully
apprised of the fact, and can make his defense. He
therefore is not concerned in case the lien is claimed
on more than one building erected upon one parcel of
land, what amount is due on one or the other of the
buildings. The lien is an entirety against the whole
parcel of land and the improvements appurtenant
thereto. As we read the mechanic's lien law, it was not
intended that the provisions contained in section 1387
were intended either as an essential in acquiring a lien,
or made for the benefit of the owner. The lien is
complete by complying with section 1386. The
statement of the amount due on buildings separately,
as provided in section 1387, would be but a restatement of the amount of the claim as required by section
1386, in another form. As we view it, this restatement
was not intended as an essential part in acquiring the
lien. It could subserve no purpose to attain that end. It
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could in no way affect the amount claimed against the
entire property. It, however, subserves a purpose in
respect to different lien claimants claiming liens
against several houses or improvements erected on
different parcels of land included in one lien. To determine the equities as between lien claimants of the
same class where the law requires them to prorate, it is
important to determine the exact amount due to each
claimant upon each of the several buildings or improvements erected on different parcels of land in
order to prevent one from getting more than his share
in case the proceeds of a sale of the property are insufficient to satisfy all the claimants in full. This,
however, does not affect nor concern the owner of the
property, nor does it affect the validity of the lien as
such, as against him or the property. But it is argued
that effect must be given to all the requirements of the
statute respecting the things to be done to acquire a
lien. This is true, but, as we have attempted to show, a
discrimination must be made between the things that
are necessary to acquire a lien and those thai are
merely intended to protect the interests of the lien
claimants between or among themselves. The statements in section 1387, as we view it, clearly belong to
the latter class. The statements of the claimant provided for in section 1386 are made sufficient to acquire a lien and to protect the owner of the property.
To hold that a restatement of the amount of the claim
in another form is likewise necessary to acquire a lien,
unless the statute requires this to be done in terms, is
adding, by construction, an essential not required by
the statute. The construction we place upon the sections quoted gives the language contained therein full
force and effect. The statement required in section
1386 of the amount claimed is thus to acquire a lien,
and the statement in section 1387 is for the purpose
above indicated.
But it is further argued-and the argument at first blush
seems plausible-that while the effect of the two sections construed together was, as we claim it to be, as
originally enacted, such is not the case now, because
section 1387 has been amended, and thereby its effect
changed. The section corresponding to the present
section 1387 is found in 2 Comp. Laws 1888, and is
there designated as section 3812, and reads as follows:
"In every case in which one claim is filed against two
or more buildings, mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person, the person filing
such claim must at the same time designate the amount
due him on each of such buildings, mining claims or
other improvements, otherwise the lien of such claims
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is postponed to other liens. The lien of such claimant
does not extend beyond the amount designated, as
against other creditors having liens, by judgment,
mortgage, or otherwise, upon either of such buildings
or other improvements, or upon the land upon which
the same are situated. " The law was recast and
amended in 1890 (chapter 30, p. 24, Sess. Laws 1890),
wherein section 3812 is omitted. It was again amended
in 1894 (Sess. Laws 1894, p. 44, c. 41), where it was
re-enacted in its present form. It is conceded, in fact no
one can dispute on reasonable grounds, that, with the
italicized portion added, the failure ro state the amount
due on each of several buildings or improvements
could not invalidate the lien as against the property or
the owner thereof, but its effect would only be to
postpone the lien to others in the same class. The logic
of this admission is a concession that the statement of
the amount due on each building separately, as required by section 1387, was not an essential part of the
lien as such. It is urged that, since the Legislature
eliminated the provision of what the effect should be
in case of a failure to make the statement required in
said section 1387, it was thereby intended to make the
statement an essential part of the lien itself. We cannot
yield assent to this deduction. If the Legislature intended that a failure to make such a statement should
invalidate the lien theretofore valid without it, we
think it would have said so in plain terms. We think
that the amendment should not, by mere construction,
be given that effect unless no other construction is
reasonable. It frequently occurs*718 that statutes are
enacted declaratory of some rule of law or equity. Our
own statutes teem with such instances. The mere fact,
therefore, that it is enacted into a statute does not
create the right or remedy, as the case may be. Both
would exist without the statute. The statute in such
cases merely states the right without having recourse
to the original rule. The fact, therefore, of the omission
of the equitable rule contained in the italicized portion
of the original section of which section 1387 is an
amendment in our judgment would not affect the court
in working out equity between lien claimants. The
purpose of the omitted portion was to fix the penalty
for the failure to state separately the amount due on
each building. Is it reasonable to suppose that the
Legislature, by removing the mild penalty, thereby
intended to create a far more drastic one without
saying so in terms? We do not think so. We think the
effect of an omission to state the amount claimed on
each building with and without the omitted portion of
the section above quoted amounts to this: While that
portion of the original section was in force, the courts
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were compelled to enforce the penalty in every case
where the statement required by section 1387 was
omitted, whether the equities required it or not, while,
under the present form of that section, the court is at
liberty to enforce it or not as justice and equity demand in each particular case The mere fact that section 1387 is mandatory m form does not necessarily
make it so m its effects It is an elementary rule of
construction that the mere form of the statute does not
control in this respect Sutherland on Stat Const §§
446, 447
In view of the somewhat singular conditions arising by
both the terms as well as the conditions of our mechanic's hen law, in view of the amendments and
changes and omissions therein, we have been unable
to find authorities directly in point upon the matters
discussed herein The following cases, however, in
some degree at least, support all the views herein
expressed These decisions are based upon statutes
similar in many respects to our own Willamette Co
v Shea (Or) 32 Pac 759,Lyon v Logan, 68 Tex 521,
5 S W 72, 2 Am St Rep 511 JPhilhps v Gilbert, 101
U S 725, 25 L Ed 833,Wallv Robinson, 115 Mass
429,Lax v Peterson, 42 Minn 221, 44 N W
3,Wheeler v Ralph (Wash) 30 Pac 709 There are
cases which hold that provisions substantially like
those contained in section 1387 are essentials m acquiring a hen Whether such provisions are part of the
section wherein are contained the essentials to acquire
a hen or not, we cannot determine without recourse to
the statute creating the lien, and, not having access to
them, we cannot examine them It is manifest, however, that the courts that have so held have construed
the mechanic's lien law with undue strictness Wilcox v Woodruff, 61 Conn 578, 24 Atl 521, 1056, 17
L R A 314, 29 Am St Rep 222, is a fair type of the
cases holding adversely to the views that we entertain
In that case, however, there are two able dissenting
opinions which, to our minds, state the rule of construction respecting mechanic's lien statutes correctly
The cases of Crawford v Anderson, 129 Ind 117,28
N E 314,Culver v Elwell, 73 111 536, and some
others, perhaps, are of the same class None of these
cases, however, in our judgment, reflect the true spirit
of our mechanic's hen law, and therefore we decline to
follow them But there is room for contention that the
demurrer was erroneously sustained upon another
ground As appears from the complaint, the contracts,
and from the description of the property, the whole
matter was treated as an entirety by all parties in interest This being so, the two buildings were not,
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within the purview of our statutes, to be treated as
separate buildings This for the reason that all hens of
any class would prorate upon the whole, regardless as
to whether the labor was performed on one or the other
of the buildings, or the material was used in the one or
the other The very purpose of section 1387 being
thus eliminated from the claim m this case, a noncompliance with it cannot affect any rights This
statement must, of necessity, be taken in the light of
our construction of the several sections of our hen law
and their effect in relation to each other as explained in
this opinion We desire to affirm again that, where a
statute requires certain things to be done to acquire a
right, nothing short of a substantial compliance with
the statute will answer, but where a statute requires
things to be done in case certain conditions exist, then,
before the statute can be operative, it must appear that
the conditions are m fact present If we are right,
therefore, that m this case the hen and the buildings
are to be treated as an entirety, then the conditions
provided for in section 1387 did not exist and the
section is not applicable These views, as we think,
are sustained by the following California and other
cases, which are based on statutes very similar to our
own Booth v Pendola, 88 Cal 36, 23 Pac 200, 25
Pac 1101,Warren v Hopkins, 110 Cal 506, 42 Pac
986,Post v Fleming ( N M ) 6 2 Pac 1087,Idaho M &
M Co v Davis. 123 Fed 396, 59 C C A 200
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause
remanded with instructions to the district court to
vacate the judgment, reinstate the case, overrule the
demurrer, and permit the respondent to answer if she
is so advised, and proceed with the case in accordance
with this opinion Costs of this appeal to be taxed
against respondent
McCARTY, C J , and STRAUP, J , concur
Utah 1906
Eccles Lumber Co v Martin
31 Utah 241, 87 P 713
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM "K
Appellees' August 13, 2008 Wrongful Lien Letter
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August 13,2008
Peterson Plumbing Supply
Ann. Don Peterson
90N.600K.
Richfield. Utah 84701
Re: Notice of Wrongful Liens
Deac Mr. Peterson:
1 appreciate your cordial conversation on the phone this afternoon. As you are aware,
our office represents General Construction and Development (GCD). Inc. and the other
owners of the property who were served with Notice of Liens regarding the liens you have
filed on Building O, Building S, Building X. Building N, Building V and Building W. 1 am
aware of 30 liens being filed so for. As I informed you today, these liens are wrongful and
must be removed within 10 days. These liens have caused irrepairable harm and damages to
my client, GCD, Inc. Dozens of owners have received the Notice of Lien and have contacted
my client. Because of the owners' lack of understanding of lien laws they believe that GCD.
Inc. has done something wrong and has not paid their bills. Many of the owners now believe
that GCD, Inc. is insolvent and about to declare bankruptcy and these rumors have been
spreading to other owners and the general public. As you are aware, GCD, Inc. still has
many condominiums for sale. My clients sell their homes by word of mouth and right now
your wrongful liens have caused the general public to lose faith in the stability of my client.
GCD, Inc.*"
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 specifically states that the Notice of Lien must be tiled
within 180 days of the time the Certificate of Occupancy is given. There is no ambiguity in
this statutory requirement and I have litigated this issue before. Your liens were filed after
the 180 days elapsed and they are therefore not authorized pursuant to the statute. Utah Code
Ann. §38-9-1 states that if the lien is not authorized by statute then it is a wrongful lien. Mr.
Peterson, you are aware that General Construction and Development has paid Pace
Plumbing, Inc. the full price of all the work and materials that were provided to the job. You
were aware that over 1 80 days had elapsed since the Certificate of Occupancy was given on
these liens. Further, you never once called GCD, Inc. and informed them that you had not
been paid by Pace Piumbmg. If General Construction and Development would have known
that you were not being paid, they would have stopped paying Pace Plumbing and would
have paid you directly. Your own actions have caused you not to receive payment for those
materials because you were aware that Pace Plumbing was not paying and you failed to
provide this knowledge to my clients and failed to protect yourself against further losses. It
is because of your failures that you are now in this predicament. GCD, Inc. has not done

anything wrong and they have always paid ail their bills on time and continue lo do so. they
should not be responsible for your own failures and those of Pace Plumbing.
Not only are the Notice of Liens filed untimely, but many of the liens contain material
misstatements or false claims. Many of the Notices of Lien have the last day of the materials
being provided well after the date the Certificate of Occupancies were given and after the
buildings were completely finished. It goes without saying that Peterson Plumbing Supply
could not have provided plumbing materials to a building that was completely finished and
Certificates of Occupancy issued.
You are hereby given notice, pursuant to U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et al., that these liens are
wrongful and you have ten days to release these wrongful liens or you will be liable to my
client in the amount of SI 0.01)0.00 per wrongful lien or for treble the actual damages,
whichever is greater. Since 30 liens have been recorded, that is a total of $300,000 you will
have to pay my clients if the liens are not removed. Further, your actions in filing these
wrongful liens constitute a Class B misdemeanor pursuant to U.C.A. § 38-1-25.
Please be aware that my clients will pursue this matter immediately in court if the
liens are not removed. In Court they will seek the lull amount of damages plus their attorney
lees. 1-ven if you remove the liens, the damage your actions have caused has already taken
place and most likely cannot be repaired. Your willful disregard to my client's reputation
VAK\ good name is disheartening. You could have communicated with Genera! Construction
and Development many months ago and avoided all of these issues. Further, you could have
informed them that you were planning to file liens before you actually filed them so thai my
clients could have had some time to discuss the issue with you and hopefully they could have
convinced you not to file the liens. Even if you did decide to file the liens, at least my clients
would have had some time to speak, with the various owners and prepare them for what was
happening so they would not become so worried.
My clients hope that they will not have to pursue litigation against you and that you
will quickly remove the liens. However, if this does not happen within 10 days of today my
clients will have no other option. Please feci free to call me at my office to discuss these
issues.
Respectfully,

Paul I). Dodd
Attorney f'orGCD. Inc.

ADDENDUM "L
Order on Petition to Nullify Liens dated November 14, 2008
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STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTV

Paul D.Dodd (10675)
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
Counsel for Petitioners
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)426-8200
Facsimile: (801)426-8208
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT, INC, a Utah
Corporation; BRANDON D. WILSON;
JUSTIN A. & SHANON HUTCHINS;
BLAKE WALKER; BRACKUS LUKE
RAY; MARY L. DOYL, CLIFF & LISA
STRADLING; JAMES & WENDI
HARVEY; JULIE GRAY; SCOTT E. &
BRITTANY WILSON; ANDREW W. &
KRISTA W. YOUNG; JAMES &
MARGARET PURCELL; NICHOLAS
S. & RYAN J. BERNARD; DONALD R.
& WENDY ROGERS; PLEASANT
GOVE PROPERTY, LLC; ANDREW
RAMMELL; ROBERTM. BERRY;
LYLE F. PETERSEN; SCOTT
GOODMAN and WILLIAM &
CHELSEY TIPTON, individuals.

ORDER ON PETITION TO
NULLIFY LIENS

Civil No. 080402976

Judge Samuel D. McVey

Petitioners,

PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY, a
Utah Corporation.
Respondent.

000139

THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to Petitioners' Petition to Nullify Liens.
A hearing was held on this Petition on October 8, 2008 before the honorable Judge Samuel D.
McVey. Petitioners were present represented by Counsel Paul D. Dodd and Respondent was
present represented by Counsel Dana T. Farmer. The Court having reviewed all applicable
pleadings and heard oral arguments on the case and for good cause appearing does hereby now
ORDER, ADJUDGE, and DECREE as follows:
1.

Respondent filed its Notice of Lien's after 180 days from the date of final
completion and therefore the Notice of Liens were untimely.

2.

Respondents inchoate lien rights expired before its Notice of Liens were recorded.
At that point their lien rights were void and could not be resurrected by a filing of a
Notice of Completion.

3.

Therefore, the Court finds that all the liens involved in this Petition on Building N,
V, W, X, and Y are wrongful liens and are void ab initio.

4.

The properties are hereby released from the lien and a legal description of these
properties is attached to this Order as Exhibit "A".

5.

Petitioner can record a certified copy of this Order with the County Recorders.

6.

The issue of attorney's fees, costs, damages or statutory penalties is reserved for
another hearing.

DATED this

/J

day of

Odd 2008.
^•v*A*.

BY THE COURT: ° ^ V

t<r

';.
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JTOGE SAMUEIL D. M0VEY

%
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Approved as to Form:

Dana Farmer
Counsel for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class US mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy
ofthe foregoing on this® day of October, 2008 to the following:
Dana T. Farmer
Smith and Knowles, P.C.
4723 Harrison Blve. #200
Ogden, Utah 84403
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ADDENDUM "M
Partial Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Decision

fourth Judiaai D-t
of Utah County. J5i;
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GENERAL CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al

kkm&L

\J \ \

Plaintiff,
)
) Case No. 080402976
)

vs .
PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
October 8, 2008

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SAMUEL D. MCVEY
Fourth District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Paul Dodd
FILLMORE, SPENCER
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801)42 6-8200

For the Defendant:

Dana Farmer
SMITH, KNOWLES, P.C.
4723 Harrison Boulevard
Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801)476-0303

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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-44and void, and released from the property.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

order in this case, Mr. Dodd.

I will ask you to prepare the
The liens -- notices of liens

on the -- and therefore the underlying lien on buildings, or
units -- whatever they are -- N, V, W, X and Y are declared
wrongful liens, and wall be expunged -- released.
1 think that Mr. Farmer is spot on when he says what
the statute meant and what the legislature says it meant.
Having been somewhat involved with looking at that statute and
evaluating it while on the construction section of the bar, I
think he is precisely right.

But my opinion on that doesn't

matter because the Court of Appeal has said something else.
The Court of Appeal has said in deciding whether
a person is entitled to a lien that -- they said this in
Foothill —

that in this case that I'm referring to paragraph

20 of the Foothill case.

"In this case, whether or not Judston

was, quote, 'entitled to a lien,' unquote, is determined at the
time Judston filed its disputed third notice of interest July 14,
2006."
Now in reading that under probably what the legislature
intended and what Mr. Farmer would say, you would stop there and
say, "Well, yeah, were they a licensed subcontractor at that
time?"

Then Foothill goes past that and says, "No, you look at

whether their lien is timely."

That's what Foothill says.

So

Foothill substantially expands the statuter and the Court has to

nnnvw
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2

follow that,
In this case the inchoate lien rights expired before the

3

notices of lien were recorded.

4

the certificate of occupancy was issued, indicating substantial

5

completion on these projects.

6

were void and they disappeared and could not be resurrected by

7

the subsequent recording or filing with the State of the notice

8

of completion.

9

They became void 180 days after

Accordingly, at that point they

Further, the notices of completion -- I think the sta --

10

the notice of completion statute is intended to allow someone

11

to give notice to all of the suppliers and subcontractors and

12

shorten the time from 180 days to 90 days to record a lien.

13

it's supposed to be issued within that 180-day period early on

14

in order to shorten that.

15

is, not to resurrect voided inchoate lien rights.

16

So

That's what the intent of that statute

So I -- you know, I was quite frankly surprised when I

17

saw how the Court came out in Foothill, like Mr. Farmer was.

I

18

believe today that he's correct in this view of what the statute

19

means and what the legislature said, but nonetheless, the Court

20

has to abide by his ruling, and look at whether -- and rather

21

than say entitled to a lien means a statutory definition, saying

22

entitled to a lien means you look and see whether they had a

23

lien right that they could still record on at the time that they

24

recorded the notice of lien.

25

that's what the Court of Appeal has said, and so I have to do

It's kind of surprising to me, but

DO0279
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~u Her f^d on t t a« , the riotio Jt lien^ will be released
ly -- either by order or the Court or by other means that Counsel
aqree upon, and we'll take it from there, and then we'll -- once
you've been able to conduct your discovery on these other issues,
we'11 look at that.
I don't know if you'd be anticipating filing a
'riwsuit aqamst the general contractor or whomever you were an -whomever Peterson Plumbing was contracting with, but you might
want to look at -- if you do - - well, I don't know if it would
be advisable to consolidate those things or not.
there would be some similar facts, but maybe not.

It seems like
Maybe they're

sufficiently different that the cases shouldn't be consolidated.
So I'll you prepare that order, Mr. Dodd, serve that on
Mr

Farmer in due course, and then submit it.

We'll —

you know,

we'll look at it if there are no -- we'll sign it if there are no
objections, okay 9
MR. DODD.
MR. FARMER:
THE COURT

Thank ycu, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, Counsel

(Hearing concluded)
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